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STARTUPS AND INVESTORS AND TROLLS, OH
MY!: HOW COMMERCIALIZATION PATENTS
CAN BENEFIT STARTUP INNOVATION
Robert Chou*
ABSTRACT—Venture-backed startups play a crucial role in innovation and
advancing our technology. However, the development of secondary markets
for patents and the proliferation of patent assertion entities starting in the
early twenty-first century has made the patent ecosystem a difficult
environment for startups to navigate. Startups face challenges that their more
established counterparts do not. First, startups must rely heavily on external
sources of funding and, as a result, many decide to file for patents early in
their lifecycle to signal their value to potential investors. Second, patent
assertion entities threaten startups with patent infringement suits at a
disproportionately high rate, which disrupts startups’ productivity and
diverts their limited resources. This Note explores the “vicious patent cycle.”
The cycle begins when startups file patents to signal worth. Then, when 90%
of these startups fail, they leave behind patents that grow the “patent thicket”
as well as opportunities for patent assertion entities to stifle innovation.
Together, these negative externalities exacerbate the challenge of building a
new company. Unfortunately, the United States patent system is not well
suited to put an end to the cycle. Thus, this Note introduces a solution for
startups: the small business commercialization patent. The small business
commercialization patent is a modified form of the commercialization patent
introduced by Ted Sichelman but is tailored to meet the unique needs of
venture-backed startups.
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INTRODUCTION
Venture-backed technology companies (startups) produce significantly
more influential inventions per investment dollar compared to established
firms in the same industry.1 Startups are commonly associated with terms
like “innovation,” “game-changing,” and “disruption.” It is easy to think
these things about startups because we only hear about the successful ones.
Companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and Slack are “unicorns,” representing
only 1% of technology companies that raised seed-round capital.2 We do not
often hear about failed startups because there is no such thing as a “startup
death certificate,”3 so the estimated 90% of startups that fail do so quietly.
If the goal of the patent system is to enable innovation and to facilitate
the commercialization of novel products, then our current patent system is
not doing its job, at least not for startups. Startups, like their more-established
counterparts, are incentivized to acquire patents as a means to exclude
competitors and reap the benefits of a limited monopoly. However, as a result
of the startup industry’s business model, startups face unique challenges that
larger technology companies do not. Specifically, startups face hurdles
during venture capital (VC) fundraising and have a high rate of failure. As a
result, startups are further incentivized to expend limited resources to obtain

* Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., 2020. I would like to give a special thanks
to Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña for her guidance through this writing process.
1 David Benson & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Corporate Venture Capital as a Window on New
Technologies: Implications for the Performance of Corporate Investors When Acquiring Startups, 20
ORG. SCI. 329, 332 (2009).
2 Venture Capital Funnel Shows Odds Of Becoming A Unicorn Are About 1%, CB INSIGHTS (Sept.
6, 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/venture-capital-funnel-2/ [https://perma.cc/SB7C-53F7].
Seed-round capital is the first of several rounds of funding for a startup to become an established business.
Carol
M.
Kopp,
Seed
Capital,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seedcapital.asp [https://perma.cc/86F2-7AAA].
3 CB INSIGHTS, supra note 2.
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patents as a means to signal the value of their technology and inventiveness
to potential investors or acquirers. Startups are also more susceptible to the
looming threat of demands made by patent assertion entities (PAEs).4
Startups that obtain patents experience a number of benefits, including
increased growth in employment and sales over the following five-year
period, as well as increased quantity and quality of subsequent patents
granted.5 It is not surprising that the totality of these benefits are pushing
one-third of startups to file a patent application at some point during their
lifetime.6 This fact alone is not necessarily bad; however, given the current
patent ecosystem, patenting startups can inadvertently contribute to the clog
in the innovation pipeline.
The broader literature7 has discussed the challenges faced by startups
individually, but this Note brings them all together in what I refer to as the
“vicious patent cycle.” This cycle, put simply, is a phenomenon where
startups are incentivized to patent early to signal their value, but because
nine-out-of-ten startups fail, many of these startups ultimately create
negative externalities, e.g., adding to the “patent thicket”8 and selling patents
to PAEs. In turn, the patent thicket and PAE portfolios grow, making it
increasingly more difficult for startups to break into a technology space and
remain operational. The cycle is inevitably a product of the patent ecosystem,
and unfortunately, the current patent regime is not well suited to intervene.
Left unchecked, the problems in the startup industry will continue to worsen
as more and more patents are left unused or end up in the wrong hands. In
response, I present a new type of patent called the small business
4 Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Patent Demands and Initial Public Offerings, 19 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 52, 55 (2015). The terms “patent assertion entity,” “non-practicing entity,” and “patent troll” are
often used synonymously, but at the end of the day, these terms refer to “any entity or individual whose
core business involves licensing or litigating patents rather than making products.” Id. Patent demands
are “letters indicating that the recipient may be infringing a patent and demanding a license fee, threats
of litigation, or lawsuits.” Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the
Venture Capital Community, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236, 238 n.2 (2014).
5 Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde & Alexander Ljungqvist, What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from
the U.S. Patent “Lottery”, 75 J. FIN. 639, 641 (2020).
6 Leonid Kravets, Do Patents Really Matter to Startups? New Data Reveals Shifting Habits,
TECHCRUNCH (June 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/21/do-patents-really-matter-to-startupsnew-data-reveals-shifting-habits/ [https://perma.cc/883Y-VFPB]. These numbers can be significantly
higher depending on the specific industry. For example, patenting by startups, specifically in the software
and biotechnology industries, is at least correlated with greater total number of financing rounds, greater
total investment, and firm longevity. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs:
An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 122 (2010).
7 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) [hereinafter Chien, From Arms Race];
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 4.
8 “Patent thickets” are large groups of patents that block innovators from performing research,
development, and commercialization. Sichelman & Graham, supra note 6, at 141.
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commercialization patent (SBCP) as a solution to break the cycle. The SBCP
uses the commercialization patent envisioned by Ted Sichelman9 as a starting
point but further develops it to address the unique challenges faced by the
startup industry. The SBCP, which grants its holder the affirmative right to
make and sell the patented invention, would give startups a path to
circumvent the patent thicket, while at the same time effectively disarming
patent trolls. SBCPs would also act as effective signals of a startup’s value
and provide investors with more certainty around their investments, which
could lead to more investment activity. Overall, the SBCP has the potential
to decrease the rate at which startups are failing.
Startups are an important engine for innovation, and they deserve a
more effective form of intellectual property protection. With the startup
industry growing, and the outlook improving over previous years,10 startups
will continue to play a vital role in pushing us through the twenty-first
century. Thus, it is imperative that we create the type of ecosystem which
allows startups to freely operate and focus on what they do best—innovate.
I.

THE PATENT ECOSYSTEM

Before diving into the startup industry, it is important to understand the
forces at play in today’s patent ecosystem. The twenty-first century patent
ecosystem was largely shaped by three interrelated phenomena: the “patent
arms race,” the patent marketplace, and the rise of PAEs. The patent arms
race—the building up of a patent arsenal by technology companies—
exponentially increased the number of patents filed and granted, many of
which were of lower quality and uncommercializable. The patent
marketplace—a secondary market where patents are bought, sold, and
traded—gave companies the opportunity to monetize their unused, lowerquality patents.11 Through the marketplace, PAEs began to build their own
patent portfolios, but with the goal of asserting them against practicing
entities to extract settlement moneys and licensing royalties. In the following
sections, I will provide some background on the patent arms race, the patent
marketplace, and the rise of PAEs. However, as you read, keep in mind that
these three phenomena are interrelated forces that developed concurrently in
time.

Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010).
2018 Startup Outlook US Report, S ILICON VALLEY BANK, https://www.svb.com/trendsinsights/reports/startup-outlook/startups-enter-2018-with-confidence-about-innovation-economy/2018startup-outlook-report-us-report/ [https://perma.cc/6LQ4-2TEF].
11 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 303–04, 310, 339.
9

10

352

17:349 (2020)

Startups and Investors and Trolls, Oh My!

A. The Patent Arms Race
The patent arms race was the exponential increase of defensive
patenting12 activity by high-tech firms around the turn of the century.13 One
of the earliest users of defensive patenting was Ford Motor Company which
sought to reduce the risk of being sued and to obtain the freedom to operate
within the automotive space.14 The more aggressive, modern-day practice of
defensive patenting emerged as a result of a few individual companies.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Texas Instruments and IBM amassed
considerable patent portfolios and monetized them through licensing and
litigation campaigns, “‘setting off . . . a chain reaction’ in the software
industry and usher[ing] in a new era of software patenting and licensing.”15
Companies that were on the receiving end of patent infringement lawsuits
and cross-licensing programs began patenting anything and everything in an
effort to develop their own patent arsenals.16 And thus began the patent arms
race. Cross-licensing negotiations became a “stack-measuring contest”
where the winner was determined solely on the quantity of patents as
opposed to evaluating each patent for its substance.17 In a patent battle
between Kodak and Polaroid, Kodak paid over $1.6 billion in damages and
was forced to shut down its instant camera business at a cost of another $1.5
billion. The settlement demonstrated the full extent of the risks and rewards
that can flow from defensive patenting.18
B. The Patent Marketplace
While the patent arms race was raging on, another phenomenon was
developing in the background: the patent marketplace (also referred to as
“secondary markets”). The patent arms race led companies to acquire patents
that “cover[ed] smaller, more incremental inventions, which [were] further
removed from the company’s core operations and represent[ed] inventions
with limited commercialization potential,” resulting in the accumulation of

12 “Defensive patenting” is the practice of filing patents in order to prevent others from entering a
technology space, to obtain access to the technology of others through cross-licensing deals, and to
neutralize patent infringement lawsuits. Id. at 308. While defensive patents do not offer any actual legal
defense, they can be used to bring counterclaims in response to a patent infringement suit with the goal
of both parties dropping the suit to end a stalemate. James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 731 (2015).
13 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 303–04.
14 Id. at 303.
15 Id. at 305–06.
16 Id. at 306.
17 Id. at 308.
18 Id. at 306–08.
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“low-quality” patents.19 Not wanting to maintain a large number of these
patents, companies looked to the patent marketplace as a means to dispose
of them.20 Jerome Lemelson, an independent inventor, and Intellectual
Ventures, a patent holding company, earned massive sums of money by
asserting, rather than commercializing, the patents they acquired, which
raised awareness of the opportunities offered by the patent marketplace.21
The proliferation of PAEs in the 2000s created a new class of active buyers
eager to follow in the footsteps of Lemelson and Intellectual Ventures.22
Since the 2000s, NPEs have collectively purchased as much as 90% of the
patents sold in public auctions, with a single entity, Intellectual Ventures,
accounting for 75%.23 With the supply of and demand for patents high, the
marketplace continued to grow, maturing into the state it is in today.
C. Rise of the Patent Assertion Entity
PAEs are a subset of non-practicing entities (NPEs) which obtain
patents without any intention to practice the patents or release them into the
public domain.24 PAEs assert their patent portfolios through litigation or the
threat of litigation against operating companies that are currently practicing
or will in the future practice the patent being asserted.25
PAE activity has grown substantially during the twenty-first century,
especially over the past decade.26 In 2007, PAEs filed 25% of patent lawsuits,
jumping to 60% in 2012.27 Their emergence followed in the wake of the dotcom bubble-burst and dramatically altered the patent landscape.28 During the
1990s and 2000s, tech startups accumulated patents as a means to secure
venture capital funding and to prolong incubation periods.29 When the bubble
burst in the early 2000s, failed startups and other tech companies auctioned
off their patents in secondary markets.30 PAEs that acquired these patents
Id. at 339.
Id. at 313–14.
21 Id. at 311–13.
22 Id. at 311.
23 Id. at 314.
24 Kristin Garr, IP Protection for Startups: The Role of Legislation in Stopping Patent Trolls and
Encouraging Innovation, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., Aug. 30, 2018, at 1, 4, http://bciptf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/Kristin-Garr-S18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4KE-RSML].
25 Id.
26 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 55 (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/R633-DQN4].
27 Feldman, supra note 4, at 238.
28 Rice, supra note 12, at 737.
29 Id. at 738.
30 Id.
19
20
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would then use them to threaten patent infringement litigation against
productive companies.31 PAEs predominately assert weak claims through
“nuisance suits,”32 and by exploiting the high cost of litigation and
defendants’ desire to settle as quickly as possible, they can force licensing
agreements or monetary settlements.33
II. STARTUPS ARE INCENTIVIZED TO PATENT IN THE FACE OF UNIQUE
CHALLENGES
An estimated 90 to 95% of startups fail, with a majority of them doing
so after their fourth year when investors cease funding.34 Shikhar Ghosh
conducted a study of 2,000 companies that received at least $1 million in
venture funding between 2004 and 2010.35 He found that 75% of venturebacked companies never returned cash to their investors, with 30 to 40% of
them liquidating their assets and investors losing everything.36 There are
many reasons why a startup fails, but the reason that tends to appear at the
top of the list is running out of money.37 Thus, startups are incentivized to
patent early as a means of signaling their value to potential investors, in
hopes of securing additional funding or to attract potential acquirers.
A. Venture Capital Fundraising Incentivizes Patenting for Signaling
Purposes
Startups are incentivized to patent early to increase their access to
funding.38 The “signaling theory” of patent law suggests that patents play an
important role in signaling the value of a firm’s technology and
inventiveness.39 Patents are considered effective signals in the context of

Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 312.
Rice, supra note 12, at 738.
33 Id. at 739.
34 Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20,
2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190
[https://perma.cc/FYQ8-LKAH].
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 The
Top
20
Reasons
Startups
Fail,
CB INSIGHTS
(Nov.
6,
2019),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-failure-reasons-top/
[https://perma.cc/2D2Y-NL6W].
38 See Bronwyn H. Hall, Is There a Role for Patents in the Financing of New Innovative Firms?, 28
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 657, 670 (2019).
39 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 6, at 113; see Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
625, 653 (2002) (positing patents may be used to signal quality of a start-up); see also Mark Lemley,
Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 143–44 (2000)
(discussing patents’ increasing use as financing tools with the advent of VC financing and VCs’ “lovehate relationship” with patents).
31
32
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startup financing because they reduce the information asymmetry between
investors and entrepreneurs by conveying three pieces of important
information.40 First, a patent’s specification and claims reveal a wealth of
information that is otherwise unobtainable: how to make and use the
invention, the best mode of practicing the invention, and how the invention
is novel and nonobvious.41 Second, because patents are relatively costly for
startups, they signal positive attributes about the startup that are difficult to
mimic by firms without such positive attributes.42 Third, as a result of the
patent application and review process, information contained in patents tends
to be credible, which reduces investors’ verification costs.43
In practice, patenting positively correlates to certain firm characteristics
and it plays a valuable signaling role in the early stages of a startup. The
number of patents a firm owns has been correlated to a firm’s knowledge
capital, productivity of R&D spending, innovativeness, and value.44 Several
studies have reported these effects, especially among startup and early-stage
companies seeking to use patents to attract financing events and to improve
their chances of being acquired or going public.45 VCs view patents and
patent applications as evidence that the firm is “well managed, is at a certain
stage in development, and has defined and carved out a market niche.”46
Patenting activity by startups is correlated to better performance and an
increased likelihood of success.47 An empirical study examining VC-backed
companies in the U.S. from 1976 through 2005 found that 31.5% of patenting
startups were successful in completing an IPO, whereas only 7.2% of nonpatenting startups were so.48 Furthermore, only 5.6% of patenting startups,
compared to 14.2% of non-patenting startups, filed for bankruptcy.49
Additionally, startups with patents receive more investments and have longer
incubation periods compared to startups that do not patent.50

40 Jerry Cao & Po-Hsuan Hsu, The Informational Role of Patents in Venture Capital Financing 1
(June 8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678809 [https://perma.cc/LY9Y3YV4].
41 Long, supra note 39, at 647.
42 Id. at 648.
43 Id. at 649.
44 Id. at 652.
45 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 6, at 113.
46 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1505–06
(2001).
47 Cao & Hsu, supra note 40, at 3.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 9–10.

356

17:349 (2020)

Startups and Investors and Trolls, Oh My!

B. The Current Patent System Favors the Inventor Who Files First
To make matters worse, the U.S. patent system not only permits
inventors to file early, but it also incentivizes them to do so. The current
patent laws do not require actual reduction to practice—the act of making
the invention “exist in real space, and showing that it works.”51 Instead, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) allows inventions to be
constructively reduced to practice when it meets the disclosure requirements
in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which only requires that the inventor “adequately
describe, enable, and convey the best mode of the invention[.]” 52 The shift
from actual to constructive reduction to practice effectively removed a
barrier, e.g., having a working prototype, that previously prevented
premature patenting.53 Furthermore, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
which went into effect March 16, 2013, shifted the U.S. patent system from
a “first-to-invent” to a “first-to-file” approach. The first-to-file system grants
the patent to the inventor who races to the USPTO and files for the patent
first, placing an even greater emphasis on patenting early compared to its
first-to-invent predecessor. Issues with early patenting are further
exacerbated by the tendency of the USPTO to grant patent claims that greatly
exceed the scope of the patent’s disclosure, giving the patentee a broad
exclusionary right and the ability to block inventions that are “far removed
from the disclosed invention.”54
III. STARTUPS ARE CREATING NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES FOR
INNOVATION
There is no doubt that startups are pushing the envelope and have an
overwhelmingly net positive effect on innovation. However, in their pursuit
of innovation, startups can inadvertently create negative externalities that
perpetuate the vicious patent cycle. It is important to understand what these
negative externalities are and how they are created, so that their impact may
be curtailed or avoided altogether.
A. The Threat of PAEs and the Startup Industry
PAEs are a major player in the vicious patent cycle and impact the
startup industry. Startups are particularly susceptible to the threat of a patent
lawsuit and PAEs are aware of this fact. A staggering 75% of defendants in

51
52
53
54

Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 73 (2009).
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018).
Cotropia, supra note 51.
Sichelman, supra note 9, at 350.
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PAE suits are privately held companies,55 and more than half of defendants
make less than $10 million in revenue per year.56 As a comparison, startups
make up only 16% of the defendants when the suing entity is operational,
which leads to the inference that PAEs are selectively targeting startups at a
disproportionately high rate.57 These statistics are corroborated by survey
results revealing that 59% of VCs and 66% of startup companies reported
that all or most of the patent demands they received come from “entities that
license or litigate patents as their core activity.”58 Overall, 70 to 75% of VCs
reported that PAEs have threatened litigation against one of their portfolio
companies.59
Startups, especially those in the early stages, are not equipped to deal
with PAE demands for various reasons. For one, startups lack the necessary
resources and experience to analyze patent validity or infringement claims
within the context of a patent demand. 60 Second, PAEs can often point to
other firms that have settled on a similar demand, which creates precedent
and adds a presumption of validity to their claim.61 Third, PAEs strategically
target startups during critical phases in their lifecycle, e.g., prior to a funding
event or an IPO, to force a quick settlement.62 Fourth, PAEs hold hundreds,
if not thousands, of patents, compared to the handful of patents (if any) that
a startup may have.63 Lastly, PAEs leverage the high cost of litigation to force
smaller firms to choose the more rational and less costly option to settle
outside of court.64
Settle, fight, or do nothing—a startup is financially burdened by PAE
demands no matter what they do. For example, the cost of defending against
a patent demand ranged from $168,000 to $857,000, depending on whether
the startup decided to fight inside or outside of the courtroom, and the cost
of settling was an average of $340,000.65 Adding in the fact that the median
seed-round deal size was $350,000, and half of startups never move past the
55 Nathaniel Borenstein, More Patent Trolls Are Targeting Startups. Here’s What You Can Do.,
ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/310648 [https://perma.cc/7DXP485Q].
56 Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2014) [hereinafter
Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls].
57 Id.
58 Feldman, supra note 4, at 242–43.
59 Id.
60 Neal S. Vickery, Don’t Forget About the Little Guys: Trolls, Startups, and Fee Shifting, 13 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 171, 177–78 (2015).
61 Id. at 178.
62 Id.
63 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 466.
64 Borenstein, supra note 55.
65 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 465.
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seed stage,66 the following inference can be drawn: settling the average
demand from a PAE, which is $340,000, is almost enough to bankrupt half
of the startups that raised seed-round funding. Fast-forward to the secondquarter of 2018, the average and median size of seed-stage deals was
$600,000.67 Even with the growth of VC deals, at least half of startups would
lose over half of their seed funding when settling a patent demand.68
PAEs’ demands have other undesirable side-effects, such as negatively
impacting the productivity of startups and deterring potential investors.
Colleen Chien’s survey of seventy-nine startups that had received a patent
demand revealed that 40% experienced a significant impact which resulted
in outcomes such as a business strategy pivot, a product change, or a delay
in hiring or meeting operational milestones.69 Patent demands also hurt
startups indirectly by signaling a risky investment to investors. In a study
conducted by Robin Feldman, every VC surveyed indicated that the mere
presence of a patent demand on a startup could potentially be a deterrent in
deciding whether to invest in that company.70 About half of the respondents
indicated that it would be a major deterrent on its face, and the other half
indicated that their decision to invest would depend on the particular
circumstances.71 After all, “no one wants to invest in a company where . . .
investor money is going to be ‘bled to patent trolls.’”72 PAEs are a serious
threat to startups because they have the potential of shutting them down with
one fell swoop. At a minimum, a looming patent demand is a distraction that
diverts limited resources away from productive activities, such as R&D, and
creates a drain on innovation.73
B. The Vicious Patent Cycle
Once issued a patent, there are multiple ways in which a startup can
monetize it. The most obvious is to commercialize the patented invention
under the benefits of a limited monopoly. Less conventional methods for
patent monetization include selling patents to third parties and asserting

CB INSIGHTS, supra note 2.
Jason D. Rowley, Inside The Global Q2 2018 Venture Market: New Records and Titanic LateStage Rounds, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/inside-theglobal-q2-2018-venture-market-new-records-and-titanic-late-stage-rounds/
[https://perma.cc/NGM57ADE].
68 This analysis uses litigation and settlement costs from 2014, so the results are likely conservative
given that it is likely these costs have increased since 2014.
69 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 474.
70 Feldman, supra note 4, at 243.
71 Id.
72 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 474.
73 See id.
66
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patents against other practicing entities (or, in other words, behaving as a
“patent troll”). In either scenario, patents which were initially acquired for
signaling purposes later become weapons used offensively against other
practicing entities.74
Startups, like their more-established counterparts, are active in
secondary markets.75 Secondary markets offer small and medium-sized
companies the ability to “license, license and sell back, securitize or sell their
patents” when no other options for liquidity are available.76 According to
Chien’s survey of Acacia and Intellectual Ventures, less than 15% of the
patentees profiled on their websites were connected to practicing entities.77
This finding suggests that a significant portion of PAE patent portfolios were
acquired from “distressed corporations” and “failed corporations.”78 For a
failed startup, a patent asset may offer residual value to investors and a means
through which they can recoup their investment.79 A study of 285 failed
startups in the software, semiconductor, and medical device industries
between 1998 and 2008 revealed that nearly 70% of the issued patents were
sold on secondary markets within five years of an exit.80 A large majority of
the 1,766 total patents sold were acquired by operating companies and
approximately 10% were bought by non-practicing entities.81 Recent data
revealed that among the top ten buyers, NPEs bought nearly 75% of the
2,810 patents sold during the third-quarter of 2018.82
A once hopeful startup may, for a multitude of reasons, forego its
original plan to commercialize a product and instead behave like a patent
74 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 313–15; see also Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion and
Startup Innovation, NEW AM. 47–48 (Sept. 5, 2013), [hereinafter Chien, Patent Assertion]
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3894-patent-assertion-and-startupinnovation/Patent%20Assertion%20and%20Startup%20Innovation_updated.62ca39039688474e9a588f
c7019b0dde.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9WR-FKGG]. In an interview, an anonymous private equity investor
stated that two of his companies sold patents to PAEs, with one of them being on the receiving end of
three lawsuits from PAEs. Chien, Patent Assertion, supra. Realizing the opportunity to bring in resources
to the company, he periodically sold or licensed patents to different litigation entities. Id. Ironically, one
of the litigations his company faced was from a PAE that acquired a patent from one of his other portfolio
companies. Id.
75 Chien, From Arms Race, supra note 7, at 314.
76 Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 56, at 468.
77 Id. at 480.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 466.
80 Carlos J. Serrano & Rosemarie Ziedonis, How Redeployable Are Patent Assets? Evidence from
Failed Startups 22–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24526, 2018).
81 Id. at 24–25 (NPEs acquired 17% and 18% for patents in the software and semiconductor industry,
respectively).
82 Richard Lloyd, US Patent Sales Jump, with Samsung, InterDigital and Fortress Among Those
Leading the Way, AST (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.ast.com/news_article/us-patent-sales-jump-withsamsung-interdigital-and-fortress-among-those-leading-the-way/ [perma.cc/QSJ6-KPBQ].
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troll. As discussed earlier, inventors are incentivized to file for patents early
in the invention cycle, which results in uncommercializable patents.
Christopher Cotropia theorizes that because the cost of commercialization is
so high, and the likelihood of success is uncertain, the holder of an
uncommercializable patent is likely to take the lower-cost option of asserting
the patent.83 There are also fewer risks with litigation, the only downsides
being having to pay attorney’s fees and the possibility of invalidating a patent
with little commercial value to begin with.84 The advantages with pursuing
the patent troll route “prompts more patent holders to exercise their patent
options by asserting the patent in litigation as opposed to commercializing.”85
In reality, only 0.1% and 0.6% of patent litigations between 2000 and 2015
were filed by pre-product startups and failed startups, respectively.86 While
this route of patent monetization appears to be less prevalent, it is
nonetheless creating a tax on innovation.
IV. A SOLUTION FOR STARTUPS
In this section, I will introduce the concept of a commercialization
patent, as envisioned by Ted Sichelman, and highlight its benefits to the
startup industry. Then, I will propose a modified form of the
commercialization patent, the small business commercialization patent
(SBCP), and illustrate how it could be the ideal form of intellectual property
protection for startups.
A. The Commercialization Patent
An issue with the current patent system is that it rewards the inventor
who is quick to file but not necessarily the best commercializer. Ultimately,
this leads to a reality where less than half of all patented inventions in the
U.S. are commercialized.87 If the goal of the patent system is to spur
innovation and create new technologies, then there seems to be a gap
Cotropia, supra note 51, at 113–14.
Id. at 114.
85 Id.
86 Shawn
Miller,
Stanford
NPE
Litigation
Database,
STAN.
L.
SCH.,
https://law.stanford.edu/projects/stanford-npe-litigation-dataset/#slsnav-brief-dataset-methodology
[perma.cc/ZQW6-SKVS].
87 Sichelman, supra note 9, at 362; see also Daniel Fisher, The Real Patent Crisis is Stifling
Innovation,
FORBES
(June
18,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/06/18/13633/#640dcffe6f1c [perma.cc/ZQZ7-3RRZ] (in
2014, 95% of the 2.1 million active patents were not licensed or commercialized); Stephen Key, In
Today’s
Market,
Do
Patents
Even
Matter?,
FORBES
(Nov.
13,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2017/11/13/in-todays-market-do-patents-evenmatter/#40d2eded56f3 [perma.cc/EB3E-TA7Y] (approximately 97% of all patents never recover the cost
of filing them).
83
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between acquiring patents and commercializing the technology disclosed
within them. The current startup business model encourages inventors to file
for patents early. As a result, an invention is usually not at a point where it
is market-ready and its commercial success continues to remain highly
uncertain.88 To commercialize a product past the point of merely obtaining a
patent, startups must take on additional costs and risks to transform the
invention into a viable product.89
Ted Sichelman proposed the concept of a commercialization patent,
which is a patent granted in exchange for a commitment to commercialize a
novel product.90 Unlike traditional patents, commercialization patent claims
are limited to the product disclosed in the specification (including substantial
equivalents), which cures the issue—generally associated with traditional
patents—where filing early can result in a disparity between what is
disclosed in the patent and what is embodied in the final invention.91
To properly spur the productivity envisioned by Sichelman, the patent
grants its holder the affirmative right to make and sell the product in addition
to the “negative right to exclude others from making and selling the same”
or a substantially equivalent product.92 The affirmative right is a key
difference that distinguishes commercialization patents from traditional
patents. Without the affirmative right, commercialization patents fail to offer
any advantages over traditional patents. However, the affirmative right is not
infinite, as it only grants immunity to injunctive relief.93 Traditional patent
holders can still seek remedy in the form of “low, but fairly reasonable, fixed
royalt[ies].”94 To further mitigate some of the harsh consequences of granting
an affirmative right, Sichelman suggests that a commercialization patent can
only be filed after a traditional patent goes uncommercialized for a period of
three years after issuance.95 This period of time, which I will refer to as the
“grace period,” is intended to provide sufficient lead-time and a strong
incentive for a traditional patent holder to commercialize the invention as
quickly as possible.96
Commercialization patents could be beneficial to the startup industry
for two reasons. First, commercialization patents would remove the threat
and uncertainty of high-cost litigation, leaving PAEs with only one remedy
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
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in the form of a low, fixed royalty. Second, compared to traditional patents,
commercialization patents would act as stronger signals of the value of a
startup, which may result in more investments and higher dollar amounts per
investment.
B. Commercialization Patents Would Effectively Disarm Patent Assertion
Entities
Even in the post eBay world, the threat of litigation continues to exist,
though it has been curtailed.97 The threat of a patent demand continues to
exist because permanent injunctions are not entirely off the table as courts
still “may grant such relief.”98 In 2013, two-thirds of all permanent injunction
requests were granted, which was down from nearly 100% prior to eBay.99
PAEs, specifically, were granted permanent injunctions 16% of the time.100
While this number is lower, it proves that eBay was not a complete solution
to the threat of PAEs. In certain industries, e.g., biotechnology, the granting
of permanent injunctions is certain, which suggests that things may not have
changed at all for biotechnology startups.101 What’s more, the Supreme Court
did not offer any guidance on how to apply the four-factor test, so courts
have applied it differently, leading to inconsistent results across districts.102
As a result, this could lead PAEs to forum shop for districts that are more
likely to rule in their favor, which may diminish some of the good created by
eBay.103
As noted earlier, a commercialization patent grants its holder an
affirmative right to practice the invention and immunity to permanent
injunctions. With the implementation of a reasonably low, fixed royalty as
the only remedy, commercialization patent holders no longer have to fear the
threat of litigation. The trade-off for such immunity is losing a small
percentage, e.g., 1–2%, of future revenue.104 However, because of the timebound limitations of the commercialization patent, startups will continue to
be vulnerable to patent demands during the three-year grace period
97 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The Supreme Court did away
with the automatic granting of permanent injunctions in patent infringement cases, holding that a fourfactor test must be applied, and the ultimate determination is based in equity. Id. at 391–93.
98 Id. at 391.
99 Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983–84 (2016).
100 Id. at 1988. The 16% represents four out of twenty-five cases surveyed. Id.
101 Id. at 1985.
102 Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: The Impacts of Recent Judicial
Activity on Non-Practicing Entities, 12 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2011); Seaman, supra note 99,
at 1986.
103 Forsberg, supra note 102.
104 Sichelman, supra note 9, at 346.
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associated with traditional patents. Keeping in mind that the grace period
starts at the point of the patent’s issuance, PAEs may not have much runway
to assert their patents because they acquire their patents second-hand, after
the clock has started ticking.
C. Commercialization Patents Can Lead to More Investments and Larger
Investment Amounts in the Startup Industry
A commercialization patent would have the added benefit of serving as
a strong signal of a startup’s value and potential for success. The primary
reason investors decide to forego investing in novel technologies is the “high
level of risk and uncertainty involved in developing and marketing such
innovations. . . .”105 A study conducted by Stephen Kiebzak et al. estimated
that VC investment in new technologies and startups would have been $21
billion higher between the years 2008 and 2012 had it not been for patent
litigation brought by frequent litigators, or in other words, PAEs.106
Furthermore, the fixed royalty proposed by Sichelman would grant a
great deal of predictability. The inherent uncertainty in the current regime
can lead to added transactional costs during patent disputes, such as costs
associated with determining the boundaries of patent claims and the
valuation of novel technologies not yet on the market.107 Furthermore,
opportunistic behavior of PAEs results in higher royalties rates, which
reduces the chance of startups making enough profits to attract investors.108
Commercialization patents with a pre-determined, fixed remedy would
eliminate the need for strategic negotiations and the bargaining of licensing
terms. Investors would be able to account for the cost of the fixed royalty
and factor it into their investment decisions like any other operating expense.
Thus, reducing any risks associated with the startup industry could lead to
favorable outcomes during fundraising.
D. The Small Business Commercialization Patent is a Tailored Solution
for the Startup Industry
In this section, I will introduce the SBCP, a modified version of the
commercialization patent which is tailored to the startup industry and
entrepreneurs. Specifically, I will discuss the “small business” threshold, the
“exclusivity period,” and transferability of the SBCP. The goal of the SBCP
is to further innovation, while preventing abuses of the system and the
Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 43 (2015) (emphasis added).
Stephen Kiebzak, Greg Rafert & Catherine E. Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent
Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity, 45 RES. POL. 218, 229 (2016).
107 Hrdy, supra note 105, at 46.
108 Kiebzak et al., supra note 106, at 220.
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creation of negative externalities. With the right balance of parameters,
SBCPs could be a viable solution.
1. The Small Business Threshold
First and foremost, the SBCP is intended to incentivize startups and
entrepreneurs to commercialize novel inventions under the protection of a
short-term duopoly. However, without limitations, large, well-established
companies might take advantage of the system and eliminate its potential
benefits. Thus, I propose implementing a small business threshold as a
requirement for the grant of a SBCP. The guidelines for what constitutes
small business should be prescribed by the USPTO and could include any of
several parameters such as revenue, number of employees, number of
funding rounds, value of the business, or age of the business.109 Such a
requirement would ensure that only startups and other small businesses are
able to enjoy the benefits of the affirmative right.
2. Re-thinking the Negative Right
It makes sense that the SBCP should come with some form of an
exclusive right because without one, there would be less of an incentive to
pursue a patent in the first place. However, the negative right contemplated
by Sichelman may not be the best solution if the goal is to bring more novel
products to the public in the most efficient manner possible. The negative
right proposed by Sichelman allows the holder of a commercialization patent
to prevent others from making and selling the same or a substantially similar
product.110 After this term expires, the patent holder loses its right to exclude
others but can continue in its affirmative right to make and sell the product.111
Even with a shorter-term negative right compared with utility patents, the
commercialization patent can still lead to clogs in the innovation pipeline by
rewarding the patent to an inefficient commercializer and prolonging the
timeline for the product reaching the market.
Instead, I propose an exclusivity period reminiscent of the 180 days of
market exclusivity given to generic drug manufacturers that succeeds in
paragraph IV Hatch-Waxman litigation.112 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,

Tom Ireland, Welcome to the Big Leagues: At What Point Are You No Longer a Startup?,
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.business.com/articles/at-what-point-are-you-no-longer-astartup/ [https://perma.cc/6DUY-E8WA].
110 Sichelman, supra note 9, at 346. Sichelman proposes a standard term of five to eight years with
the potential of longer terms for certain industries known to have longer commercialization timelines,
e.g., pharmaceuticals. Id. at 346, 408.
111 See id. at 346.
112 Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, FDA (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/cder-small-business-industry-assistance-sbia/small-business-assistance-180day-generic-drug-exclusivity [https://perma.cc/2BT4-PN3E].
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the first generic drug company that succeeds in filing a paragraph IV
certification, challenging the validity or claiming the non-infringement of a
listed patent, is given 180 days of market exclusivity to compete with the
patent holder before other generic drug companies can enter the market.113
Following on this model, the exclusivity period for SBCP would be rewarded
to the first startup that files for a SBCP after the grace period for a utility
patent has lapsed. If granted, the startup would be given a set period during
which the USPTO would not approve follow-on SBCP applications for the
same product. In effect, the exclusivity period provides the first-mover
commercializer with the advantage of getting short-term exclusivity on
commercialization activities before losing the ability to block direct
competition from other startups.
However, the exclusivity period would not prevent the holder of the
original patent to compete with the first-mover. In actuality, this may
incentivize the original patent holder to either make efforts to commercialize
the invention themselves or license their rights to someone who is committed
to commercializing it. After the SBCP exclusivity period ends, other
commercializers would then be able to apply for a SBCP for the same
product and compete directly with the first-mover. It is reasonable and
expected that multiple commercializers will hold a SBCP for the same or a
substantially similar product. This would lead to the best outcome for
consumers, as multiple patent holders would be racing to the market first.
Ultimately, this system rewards the most efficient and committed
commercializer with first-to-market competitive advantages, such as brand
recognition and consumer loyalty.114 Follow-on commercializations would
then compete with the first-mover in the open market, which would drive the
demand for more innovative, higher quality, and lower cost versions of the
product. The duration of the exclusivity period still needs to be defined. Too
short of an exclusivity period may not incentivize startups to pursue this
route of intellectual property protection in the first place. On the other hand,
too long of an exclusivity period runs the risk of the situation where the
SBCP is granted to an inefficient commercializer (or a bad actor), which
would delay the invention’s commercialization.
3. Transferability of SBCPs During an Exit
For the subset of startups intending to stay operational,
commercialization patents would guarantee a higher rate of success as a
result of having the affirmative right to practice the invention and a limited
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right to exclude competitors. For those seeking an exit through acquisition
or sale of the patented invention, a SBCP could be a valuable asset to
potential acquirers. A large firm whose goal through acquisition is to
commercialize the startup’s technology, would gain the benefit of a clear
path to market. However, for the acquirer to capture the full benefit of
SBCPs, both the patent itself and its associated rights must be transferrable
with the technology.
The affirmative right associated with the SBCP would continue
indefinitely throughout the life of the invention in the hands of the acquirer.
With respect to the exclusivity period, there are two possible outcomes. If
the exclusivity period, at the time of transferring the patent, had already
expired, then the patent in the hands of the acquirer grants no exclusivity
period. However, if the exclusivity period, at the time of transferring the
patent, had not expired, then the clock should continue running in the hands
of the acquirer after transfer. This is a reasonable outcome because the
startup had realized a marketplace advantage during the time in which it
previously held the patent and excluded competition. Presumably, this
marketplace advantage was transferred to the acquirer upon transfer of the
patent, so it follows that the amount of time counting towards the expiry of
the exclusivity period should also be transferred.
Permitting such transfer of the SBCP could lead to favorable outcomes
for consumers. Large companies, which are arguably better commercializers
than startups, would further accelerate the entry of new products in the
marketplace.
CONCLUSION
While the small business commercialization patent has the potential to
stimulate innovation in the startup industry, there are still some details that
would need to be further defined. For example, the SBCP patent claims
would be limited to the specific product disclosed in the specification
(including substantial equivalents). In implementing the SBCP, the USPTO
should consider redefining the requirement of reduction to practice.
However, if the requirement only necessitates constructive reduction to
practice (the current regime), the patent system could potentially reward a
SBCP to a commercializer who is not quite ready for market. This would
create inefficiencies by delaying the commercialization of the product. On
the other hand, if the requirement calls for a working prototype, it may be
too onerous for startups in the early stages to satisfy, causing them to forego
the potential benefits of the commercialization patent and instead opt for a
utility patent. This raises another issue: while a startup is working towards a
prototype—which may take years to achieve—it remains vulnerable to PAE
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demands and without a signal to investors. One possible solution to bridge
the gap is to establish a provisional application which is available to startups
who have received a patent demand or are engaging with investors.115 In this
way, the provisional application would act as a temporary defense
mechanism and a showing of good faith.
Another issue to consider is that the SBCP may create some
administrative burdens as the USPTO would have to expend resources on
additional activities, such as assessing whether applicants meet the reduction
to practice requirement and monitoring the exclusivity period for all active
patents. Presumably, these are issues that could be alleviated by increasing
the cost of filing, as already contemplated by Sichelman.116 Increasing the
filing fee could also have the desirable effect of screening out inventors who
may not be as committed to commercializing the product, and who would
otherwise create a clog in the system by taking an opportunity away from the
best commercializer.
Startups are an important engine for innovation in our society, and they
face unique challenges that are not being addressed by our current patent
regime. For the amount of innovation and novel products startups produce,
they deserve a little more attention and care when it comes to intellectual
property protection. The goal of this Note is not to solve the startup
industry’s problem overnight, but rather to point it out and stimulate
discussions for re-thinking patenting strategies and patent reform.

115 See John Calvert, The Provisional Patent Application: What You Need to Know, USPTO (Dec. 3,
2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-eye/provisional-patentapplication-what-you-need-know [https://perma.cc/PM5W-YBEQ].
116 Sichelman, supra note 9, at 409.
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